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Prostitution, harm and the criminalisation of clients 
 
NINA PERŠAK 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In order to reduce the demand for prostitution and in turn the prostitution itself, the Swedish 
model of regulation of prostitution focuses on the criminalisation of clients of prostitutes. 
Sweden was in fact the first European country to criminalise the use of a prostitute’s 
services, i.e. services of an otherwise voluntary prostitute.416 The purpose of 1998 law,417 
which criminalised the users, is to criminalise the demand and stems from the belief that 
prostitution is a form of violence against women and therefore needs to be abolished 
completely. The official discourse does not differentiate between voluntary and forced 
prostitution in this respect, as all types of prostitution are considered violence.418 It draws 
upon the radical feminist perspective, which advocates this line of reasoning and is in 
Sweden also very powerful in the political sense. The latter sees prostitution as a violation 
of the women’s rights and often emphasises that prostitution cannot be entered into 
voluntarily, but that it is in fact a phenomenon ridden with violence and exploitation of 
women in a patriarchal society. France seems to be following the Swedish path with the 
National Assembly approving a cross-party, non-binding resolution (due to be followed by 
a bill in January 2012) that envisages a six-month prison sentence and a fine of 3,000 euros 
for clients of prostitutes.419 In Belgium, similar ideas have been recently voiced by CDH (a 
political party in the Brussels Parliament), proponents of which consider, inter alia, 
prostitution as such to be violence towards women (and refer a lot to their Swedish 
counterparts).420 Such a conception of prostitution, it will be argued, is misleading; it is 
legally-philosophically untenable, criminologically problematic and the proposed solution 
to the “prostitution problem”, that is the criminalisation of clients of prostitutes – not a 
solution at all (but a rather misguided societal reaction to this social phenomenon). 
The structure of the article is the following: the first part of the article will state the 
main tenets of the argument for the criminalisation of clients and suggest some 
counterarguments, particularly focusing on deconstructing the harm-claim, i.e. the claim 
that prostitution equals harm or that prostitution per se is violence. Is there any inherent 
harm-to-others in prostitution and, if yes, what sort of harm would it be? The second part 
will look more closely at the criminalisation as a tool for regulation of social reality, 
expounding the characteristics and pitfalls of this technique of social regulation. In the third 
part, some additional criminology-based arguments against the proposed criminalisation 
will be explored, followed by a concluding thought on criminalisation and the role of 
criminal law in solving such societal “problems”. 
Throughout the chapter, the term “prostitution” will be used to refer exclusively to the 
voluntary or consensual prostitution. Any type of forced prostitution falls neatly under the 
Palermo Protocol’s definition of trafficking in human beings,421 which is why the term 
trafficking in human beings is preferred when referring to forced prostitution, as it is a 
justifiably stronger term and emphasises the exploitation dimension of the crime. The term 
prostitution (without any adjective) shall, on the other hand, refer to voluntary prostitution 
alone; voluntariness defined as the law generally defines it, i.e. as the absence of force or 
threat.422 
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2. Arguments based on harm 
 
There are several other reasons why criminalisation of clients may not be such a great idea 
– some of them will be listed later in the text –; however, we shall here mostly focus on 
what seems to play the most important, largely assumed, crux of the matter: the harm of the 
prostitution. We shall focus on the proponents’ logic of argumentation behind it to see 
whether their position is a tenable one and place their endeavours within the realm of penal 
ethics – more concretely, in the realm of legitimate grounds for criminalisation in a modern 
criminal legal system. 
The main argument of the proponents of criminalisation of clients is based on two 
claims. The first claim or the first part of the argument states: “Prostitution is violence, i.e. 
harm.” The second part, already taking the first claim for a fact, moreover asserts: “As the 
supply (the prostitution/violence) is influenced by the demand for it, we should cut the 
demand by criminalising clients, thereby cutting prostitution/violence”. 
 
2.1 “Prostitution equals harm” 
 
The first part of their argument claims that prostitution equals harm or violence. In the light 
of the harm principle – the only widely accepted, unproblematic principle of criminalisation 
in a modern criminal legal system or country respecting personal liberty –, this claim is the 
strongest if “harm” is understood as “harm to others”. Before we proceed by countering this 
claim, an explanation of the two mentioned concepts may be useful. The harm principle, as 
expounded by American philosopher Joel Feinberg, states that “[i]t is always a good reason 
in support of penal legislation that it would be effective in preventing (eliminating, 
reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is 
no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values”.423 It is based on 
J.S. Mill’s “principle of liberty”424 and it simply means that harm to others – i.e. “harm” 
(not, for example, paternalism or moralism) and “to others” (to persons other than oneself) 
– is a legitimate grounds for criminalisation of someone’s conduct. 
Arguments countering this claim could assert, firstly, that prostitution is not harm. In 
fact, it will be claimed that prostitution is (highly) risky but that it is not the same as harm 
or violence. And secondly, that even if, arguendo, prostitution were equal to harm, this 
harm would be only self-harm not harm-to-others (as required by the harm principle); the 
latter not traditionally being a legitimate grounds for criminalisation. 
Regarding the first counterargument: does prostitution really equal violence, i.e. harm? 
Is prostitution violence or is it rather that prostitution is a high-risk profession where 
“employees”, if insufficiently protected, can be exposed to physical as well as 
psychological violence – which rather warrants better oversight, regulation and protection 
of prostitutes than outright prohibition? Janice G. Raymond argues that “[t]o understand 
how violence is intrinsic to prostitution, it is necessary to understand the sex of prostitution. 
The sexual service provided in prostitution is most often violent, degrading, and abusive 
sexual acts, including sex between a buyer and several women; slashing the woman with 
razor blades; tying women to bedposts and lashing them till they bleed; biting women’s 
breasts; burning the women with cigarettes; cutting her arms, legs, and genital areas; and 
urinating or defecating on women.”425 Firstly, it is doubtful whether the cases mentioned 
here really do represent the bulk or the most frequent types of sexual transaction between 
the prostitute and the client. Empirical research available on this issue can turn up with a 
very different picture.426 Secondly, acts that have not been consented to on the part of 
prostitute (and “slashing the woman with razor blades” or cutting her in any way was most 
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likely not part of the deal) or in the extent that they supersede, either in form or in intensity, 
her consent are not an inherent part of prostitution or of the “sex of prostitution” – they are 
criminal acts, they are crime and as such already justly penalised. Abuse of prostitution is 
not prostitution; it is abuse. The fact that these incidents happen within prostitution does not 
mean that they are intrinsic to it. These things also happen within marriages, but are we 
then allowed to conclude that marriage is a crime or violence? Another example: from the 
fact that A lives alone in a house, into which B breaks and rapes A, it does not follow that 
living in a house or living alone entails rape. Prostitution or living alone may be more risky 
and its subjects more vulnerable to victimisation but that does not mean that violence is 
intrinsic to those practices in the sense that they are per se harmful (and that they should, 
for this reason, be criminalised). What it should mean, however, is that the society ought to 
work on diminishing those risks by, for example, better regulation and supervision, by 
equipping prostitutes or their premises with safety devices, allowing them to work 
together,427 warning them of certain clients with known violent record or stimulating them 
to work in establishments that have been inspected and granted some sort of official 
approval based on their reaching of certain (high enough) standards428 and so forth. 
The proponents’ arguments based on harm to others therefore do not hold water. Yet, 
are their arguments really harm-based, as they purport to be? Although they use the 
language of harm, it seems they rather try to reinstate legal moralism as a legitimate ground 
for criminal-law prohibition (through giving it a legitimising coat of harm). Issues of sexual 
morality between consenting adults are traditionally not considered a legitimate basis for 
state or public intervention through criminal law, as legal moralism is not considered a 
legitimate ground for criminalisation. Coaching the issue in terms of harm, on the other 
hand, takes the debate – on the surface, at least – out of the sphere of legal moralism into 
the sphere of the harm principle. However, it seems that what lies behind the rhetoric and 
the caring language, the language of protection and harm, is often more moralistic in nature 
than harm-based.429  
Another indication of the moralism hiding underneath it can be found in the 
prohibitionists’ interests in males’ motives for going to a prostitute. Should we, in the 
context of criminalisation, be interested in the clients’ reasons for going to the prostitute, 
interested in men’s motives? These reasons are important, i.e. hold any value, only if we 
allow the possibility that the using of sexual services is not harmful, i.e. does not represent 
violence to women, per se. Only if violence/harm is content-dependent on the clients’ 
reasons, then reasons need to be examined in order to decide on a legitimate criminalisation 
of clients, i.e. of their conduct (the purchase or use of prostitute’s services). If one believes 
that prostitution (the conduct) per se harms prostitutes, understanding clients’ motives is 
not necessary for condemning prostitution through criminalisation. If offering sexual 
services to a client causes harm to the prostitute, then it does not matter whether the client 
came to her out of loneliness or out of his perverse sexual desire or the need to have his 
insecurities about his manhood and potency satisfied. It should not matter whether the 
client’s motives are more benevolent or more sinister, as it is the conduct that purportedly 
causes harm to others and is as such a legitimate object of criminalisation.  
For those who claim that prostitution as such is violence against women, i.e. harm, the 
reasons should therefore not matter, unless their derive the “harm” of prostitution from the 
vested motive of the client’s conduct, not the conduct itself. Yet, funnily enough, many 
abolitionist studies do very much dwell on the question of male reasons. Even if their major 
claim against prostitution is often couched in terms of harm, their focus regarding the 
clients’ motives is on the immorality of their conduct, not the harmfulness of it. What they 
derive (and can only be derived) from reasons/motives is the moral/immoral component of 
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conduct, i.e. the wrongness of it, not the harmfulness of it. Of course, the criminal harm 
need be a wrongful harm, meaning that harm that is not wrongful ought not to be 
criminalised, yet a wrong that is not harmful ought not to be criminalised either.430 
Regarding the second counterargument stated above, one could claim that even if 
arguendo prostitution were harmful, such harm would be to prostitutes themselves. It 
would be self-harm not harm-to-others – as required by the harm principle. Criminalising 
voluntary prostitution (even if only in the form of criminalising the demand) for the 
prostitutes’ “own good” amounts to so-called legal paternalism, which is not considered a 
good basis for criminalisation in a modern democratic liberal society431 – even if it may be 
considered good grounds for other state intervention, such as social and education policy. 
According to the only widely-accepted principle of criminalisation, the harm principle, only 
harm that someone caused or may cause to the other may represent a legitimate grounds for 
criminal-law prohibition – which is why we do not, for example, find it legitimate to 
criminalise smoking or criminalise those who sell tobacco (we do not conceive poor 
smokers as victims of harm and deploy criminal-law strategies to prevent them from 
meeting up with sellers), even though smoking has over the years proven to be undoubtedly 
harmful to oneself.  
Any such harm would therefore be self-inflicted (self-harm) or harm to which they 
consented – that is after all the definition of “voluntary prostitution”. And as long as the 
harm is consented to, it is not “wrongful” – idea encapsulated in the Latin maxim “volenti 
non fit iniuria”. If the harm is not wrongful, however, it is not “criminal harm”. Such an act 
loses the “criminal” quality and does not justify criminalisation. For example, boxing is 
often harmful, yet not considered wrongful as any harm resulting from it (and inflicted 
upon the boxing parties) is considered consented to; hence, it is not criminalised. 
 
2.2  “Criminalisation is The solution” 
 
The second part of the above mentioned two-pronged argument of the proponents of 
criminalisation of clients, already resting on the assumption that prostitution is harm and 
that, in order to reduce the harm, we have to therefore reduce or eliminate prostitution, 
asserts: “As demand influences supply, we should cut the demand by criminalising clients”. 
This is often seen as a softer, more prostitutes-friendly option, as it does not directly target 
or victimise the prostitutes but rather their clients. 
Now, the proponents of such criminalisation are certainly right to try to bring more 
light onto the role of the users – mostly male – in this story. There have not been to date 
many studies exploring the demand side of prostitution, which is why an important facet 
has remained hidden.432 Such research often helps dispel stereotypic notions, such as one of 
a dirty, HIV-infected prostitute, as studies reveal that often it is the prostitute who needs to 
be protected, health-wise, against the clients who are often promiscuous, unhygienic and 
reckless in wearing a condom (as it “ruins the experience” or as not wearing one “reinforces 
their masculinity”), thus spreading sexually-transmitted disease.433 Also, it is admittedly a 
good thing for the law to acknowledge the importance of economic factors driving the 
social phenomena (i.e. the influence of demand on the supply and consequently on the size 
of some undesirable social phenomenon). One could argue that in the idea of 
criminalisation of clients the economic reasons for prostitution are successfully 
acknowledged by the law – that law here recognises the importance of economic demand 
and its influence on the supply.  
However, the reduction of some less desirable (or undesirable) social phenomenon 
need not necessarily take the form of criminalisation. Criminal-law theorists always ask 
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themselves why it is so that criminalisation always seems to be a kind of knee-jerk reaction 
to various social problems (or what is perceived as social problems). Why is the criminal 
law seen as the best way, even if it is often proven to be neither effective nor justifiable? 
Using such a blunt tool as the criminal law to do the work instead of educational and social 
security measures (tackling the real causes of not all, but the majority of prostitution) can 
do more harm than good. For example, the criminalisation of prostitution users can make 
the situation worse for prostitutes as by criminalising it potentially scares off their better 
customers. Although it is not the prostitutes themselves who are being criminalised, they 
are secondarily victimised by the state in the sense of having to suffer the financial loss 
(due to the loss of some part of clients), possibly resulting in them having to work longer 
hours or accept customers whom they otherwise would not receive, which can, in turn, 
make them more exposed and vulnerable to violence. Furthermore, by focusing on the 
punishment, one focuses less on what may actually help those who have found themselves 
in the profession due to the lack of alternatives, i.e. on providing alternative employment 
opportunities, education opportunities, social and health care and so forth. 
What one has to bear in mind is that criminal law is an imprecise instrument that 
penalises people. It is a morally loaded tool as it carries with it censure. Censure or moral 
reprobation is namely what distinguishes punishment, i.e. criminal legal sanction, from 
other types of sanctions.434 The power to criminalise certain human conduct is an immense 
power that shapes our values, divides the population into criminals and non-criminals, 
limits people’s liberty of action and can make (through imposing sanctions on certain 
conduct) some people’s lives significantly worse, which is why it should – despite being 
primarily a political process – be guided by legal principles, rules and standards.435 The 
enforcing of criminal statutes, as Schonsheck argues, “is the most intrusive and coercive 
exercise of domestic power by a state. Forcibly preventing people from doing that which 
they wish to do, forcibly compelling people to do that which they do not wish to do – and 
wielding force merely attempting to compel or prevent – these state activities have 
extraordinarily serious ramifications. Indeed, no state institutions are likely to have more 
profound an impact on the lives of individual citizens than those of the criminal justice 
system. […] As a consequence, these state activities are in special need of moral 
warrant.”436 
As criminalisation precedes enforcement, what Schonsheck says about the enforcement 
of criminal statutes also holds true for its “previous stage”, i.e. the making of criminal 
statutes. Criminalisation not only defines certain human conduct (act or omission) as a 
criminal offence and assigns to it a certain criminal-law sanction; in its normative 
dimension, criminalisation has a moral character, as “to make some action a crime is to 
declare that it should not be done”.437 The act of criminalisation thus charges criminal law 
with condemnatory disposition, which is discharged every time the courts use it to punish 
someone. Through punishment criminal law not only inflicts pain; it inflicts pain in a 
condemnatory way. It is unsurprising therefore that Bentham saw it as an “evil”.438 As such 
it represents in itself a “cost” to be weighed against the possible benefits of criminalisation. 
 
3. Other downsides and counterarguments to the criminalisation of clients 
 
Apart from the mentioned flaws in harm-based argumentation against prostitution, there are 
several other reasons why criminalisation of clients is not such a blindingly brilliant idea: 
(a) this “solution” seems to show amazing trust in generally preventive or deterrent 
capabilities of law, which, however, runs contrary to empirical evidence. The history of 
prohibition of e.g. alcohol and other criminalised conduct has shown that the conduct of 
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this nature when criminalised will mostly end up being displaced (to less policed areas or 
countries) or go underground, resulting in lesser visibility and consequently lesser 
protection of prostitutes. In the case of Sweden and Romania (both prohibitionist 
countries), the research has revealed that the legislative constraints had an effect on 
prostitution in the sense of moving it mainly indoors,439 while anti-kerb crawling initiatives 
in the UK have reduced choice for prostitutes and their clients about where to solicit and 
have sex, leading to new and less safe locations to be sought;440 (b) the proponents of such 
criminalisation are not keeping in touch with the social reality or empirical research on 
clients that has been produced to date or selectively use only those data that support the 
grim picture of prostitution; (c) such a “solution” sidesteps the volenti maxim and ignores 
the will or power of consent that, legally speaking, gets in the way of portraying all 
prostitutes as victims; (d) it ignores the fact that sex is a natural or biological need and so 
people will always look for it in some way or the other, which means that the demand can 
never really be extinguished, not even if criminalised under severe punishment; (e) it 
ignores the fact that availability of prostitution can also do a lot of good by allowing some 
groups (handicapped, elderly etc.) that would otherwise find it difficult to satisfy their 
sexual needs and desires; and (f) that clients are in a position to notice whether some 
prostitute is a victim of trafficking or not and can report it to the police thereby being a 
valuable source of information and of consequent help to the trafficked victim – the source 
that will cease to exist if the clients are to be criminalised.441 
Many a discourse of the proponents of such criminalisation is gendered, which narrows 
the topic significantly as it ignores certain other types of problematic prostitution, e.g. 
prostitution of minors – boys. Moreover, by linking the “problem” of prostitution or abuse 
of prostitution with the “woman issue”, usually emphasising that it is affecting mostly 
women (and then carry on regarding harms women face today, extend it to pornography, 
lap dancing, portrayal in the media…), they are portraying a certain kind of femininity, a 
certain kind of a “woman” and thereby exclude other women, who do not belong to that 
category or agree with them, from “womanhood”, accusing them of being misled, of 
playing the man’s game and stripping them of the right to derive pleasure on their own 
terms. These groups re-define not only what is or means to be a “woman”, what 
womanhood means, but also what constitutes a woman’s pleasure, i.e. what should be (or 
rather what should not be) a woman’s pleasure.  
Such radical, basically punitive discourse tends to quash other (feminist) debates, 
labelling them as pro-violence to women, patriarchal, anti-human rights. As with arguing 
against the prevailing security discourse, which increasingly legitimises over-reaching 
surveillance and intrusions into our privacy and other human rights (not to mention 
suspects’ procedural rights) in the name of security, where such arguments are often 
understood as arguing against security itself, arguing against the radical, over-criminalising, 
zero tolerance, prostitution-equating-with violence stance, is often impatiently and wrongly 
understood as defending or even legitimising the status quo, the dominant male discourse 
and perpetuating violence against women.  
Such discourse can also be criticised for forcing victimhood on women or 
victimalising442 such women. It has a tendency to “capitalise on the image of women as 
victims”,443 silencing those women discourses that stress a more active or even more equal 
and powerful (and empowering) role of women in shaping their own sexuality and 
consensual sexual conduct. Victimalisation of prostitutes, when it is unwanted, can be 
understood as a type of victimisation itself. There is and should be, therefore, room for 
alternative discourses outside the dominant two which, as Stoebenau succinctly 
summarises, “either victimise women as helpless sexual slaves or glorify them as proud 
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whores”.444 This bipolar view is misinformed and prejudiced, but difficult to change, as 
these stereotypes lead to and are the result of cognitive blindness, which cements a very 
limited black-and-white social representation of prostitution and consequently reduces the 
options or range of proper solutions in this area.445 
Moreover, similar to monolithic understanding of all women engaged in all kinds of 
prostitution as voluntary sex workers, the perspective that sees all women in prostitution as 
victims also does little to clarify the separate, albeit connected, phenomena of prostitution 
and trafficking, little to distinguish the different shades of grey between the two extremes 
and little to give voice to all women-in-prostitution and their different experiences. In fact, 
it could be argued that forcing this one-dimensional view of prostitution on these women is 
as patronising as some of the (historically male or state) responses to prostitution and 
attitude to women in general have been in the past and present. These attitudes are based on 
the premise that “we know better” or that “we know what is good for you” and have been 
clearly displayed in the past when other (most likely moral panic-driven) solutions 
regarding “fallen women” were contemplated as well as when women were prohibited from 
enrolling into universities or prohibited from voting. Indeed, some even go on to argue that 
“the white western feminist projects of saving other women are grounded in the masculinist 
logic of protection”,446 which drives the protector, i.e. white Western feminists, to objectify 
and silence the other – the protected, i.e. foreign, exotic prostitutes, whose desire to be 
“saved” is presumed and their gratitude expected.  Which is why some see the proponents 
of such criminalisation as engaging in a long dead discourse, as stifling all values and 
achievements of female emancipation and in fact betraying feminism in its core.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Principled, legal and ethical objections to the criminalisation of clients of prostitution, 
raised in this article have rested on the notion that only the harm principle is the 
unproblematic, legitimate basis for criminalisation, meaning that only wrongful harm (to 
others) may be legitimately criminalised. Harm that is not wrongful and/or a wrong 
(immoral conduct) that is not harmful fall short of this requirement. It has been shown that 
the “harm” that the proponent often find intrinsic to prostitution is rather something that 
follows behaviour that is marginalised, forced into hiding (or invisibility), less or 
inefficiently regulated and consequently “risky”. While risk may be endemic to such a 
profession (that is more or less underground, invisible and not successfully monitored), 
there is no “harm to others” as such hidden in the voluntary prostitution. Anyone claiming 
otherwise, however, has the burden of proof, as in a country that respects human rights and 
civil liberties a presumption is and should be in favour of the individual and his or her 
autonomy or liberty. It has also been suggested that proponents of criminalisation of the 
demand side of prostitution, although on the face of it appealing to harm, are often really 
disguising paternalistic, at best, and moralistic reasons for prohibition, which are not really 
considered legitimate grounds for criminalisation in a modern criminal legal system. 
Criminological objections listed further in the text have, on the other hand, stressed the 
need for continuous research in this area and the importance of any criminal policy being 
based on such research. The media are quick to highlight some upsetting finding without 
mentioning the limitations of the study (e.g. its non-representativeness of the whole 
country) and tend to frame the topic in a bipolar fashion: prostitutes are portrayed as either 
proud whores/sexual delinquents or as victims of cruel pimps/traffickers. Once this black-
and-white conception of prostitution becomes a common-sense theory,447 misinformed and 
biased as it may be, it is rather hard to break. This blindness is particularly detrimental 
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when it narrows the vision (and imagination) of those who are entrusted with (criminal) 
policy making or with finding solutions for various social problems. As in other 
criminological areas, so in the area of prostitution, there is a need for a more systematic and 
methodologically rigorous inquiry to be carried out in order to correct “pop-
criminology”,448 often espoused by media, and provide a realistic basis for policy making. 
This is perhaps even more needed in the highly emotive topic of prostitution, where calls 
for criminalisation can be understood as a predominantly emotional rather than a rational 
response. 
Whenever criminalisation is contemplated, it is worth bearing in mind that the criminal 
code should provide an “ethical minimum” (Jellinek),449 a common denominator of 
morality that all could follow, not the maximum of morality, the highest ethical standards. 
This goes far in explaining why the harm principle is the most accepted criminalisation 
principle in Western democracies and the existence of a criminal-law principle of ultima 
ratio. In the absence of harm, that which is merely socially undesirable or less desirable or 
outside the usual moral norm, ought to be legally tolerated. 
However, criminal law provides also a symbolic platform, expressing “our shared 
beliefs of what is truly condemnable”.450 As such it is always vested not only with values 
but also with societal fears and insecurities. This is the social psychological dimension of 
criminalisation that should not be neglected. In the context of criminal law, the blood-
thirsty appeals for criminalisation of some conduct or punishment of someone can 
sometimes better be understood in terms of ‘displacement’, where un unacceptable feeling 
or thought about a person, place or thing is redirected towards a safer target. Every-day 
ontological insecurities that have no single, clearly distinguishable “cause” or enemy to 
pinpoint, often channel into fear of crime and consequently – as a means of regaining 
control – into appeals for punishment of some convenient perpetrator (who here plays the 
“safer target”). An individual or a whole group is become a scapegoat – a hostile 
discrediting routine through which people displace their aggression onto a target person or a 
group, whom they inappropriately accuse or blame for various problems. A client of a 
prostitute seen in this light can play a scapegoat for all the evils of trafficking in human 
beings, of historic and modern exploitation of women or exploitation of the poor and 
vulnerable – of course, as long we see the prostitute and prostitution in general in these 
(oversimplified) terms alone. 
The analysis of criminalisation can go far in revealing these psycho-social mechanisms 
and societal fears and insecurities hidden therein. It is up to criminal policy, however, to 
separate the wheat from chaff, as it were, to sift through all the social phenomena that 
worry people, filter them through the legitimate principles of criminalisation and limiting 
factors,451 and come out justifiably proscribing (or suggesting prohibition of) only the 
worst, wrongful conduct that is significantly harmful to other people. 
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